Social Group is group of interconnected nodes interested in obtaining common content (Scott, in Social network analysis, 2012). Social groups are observed in many networks for example, cellular network assisted Device-to-Device network (Fodor et al., in IEEE 
Base station and group of networked devices using cellular network Device-to-Device communication desired characteristics of obtaining efficient agreements among nodes while maintaining a low computational cost [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] . Also, the protocol should be immune to various malpractices by agents [24, 25, 30] (nodes in social group). Various negotiation mechanisms defined in the context of communication networks [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] are able to reduce free-riding, but, unable to prohibit it.
Various negotiation mechanisms [15, [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] defined in Multi-agent systems are based on concepts of machine learning, artificial intelligence and auction mechanism. Negotiation support systems defined in [31, 32] are based on concepts in machine learning and artificial intelligence. These negotiation protocols try and predict the future system conditions based on some historical data or observations, but are prone to failure if nodes collude [23] to form a team with an objective of taking undue benefits from the system. Negotiation protocols based on auction mechanisms [33] [34] [35] are prone to attack if agents start doing identity fraud [13] .
To counter the non-reciprocating behavior of nodes in a social group, we use the bilateral negotiation protocol [26] [27] [28] based on the Give-and-Take (GT) Criterion defined in [36] [37] [38] . Owing to the bilateral nature of negotiation, the GT is immune to Sybil attack [21, 22] and collusion [23] strategies. The GT ensures cooperation among nodes and reduction of download costs in social groups [10] . Also, the definition of the GT ensures that nonreciprocating nodes are absent and immunize it to the whitewashing attack [13] . However, nodes can gain undue benefits from the system by providing false information about their segment sets.
In this paper, any node A will refuse to provide copies of segments to another node B, unless A receives some new segments in return from B. We refer to this as the Give-and-Take Criterion [36] [37] [38] . We consider a special case of "Full Exchange" in which node A is ready to provide copies of all segments available with itself, if it receives a copy of at least one new segment from its exchanging partner node B. After exchange, both A and B will have the union of their individual pre-exchange segment sets. Each node wants to acquire the universe of segments at low cost via predominantly local exchanges among nodes, subject to the GT; otherwise, segments may be obtained at much higher cost, from the content provider in the social group.
To participate in GT-compliant local exchanges, each node needs to have some segment(s) with itself-otherwise, it will not be able to get segments from other nodes, as the GT fails. For this reason, each node downloads an initial set of segments that allows it to participate in local exchanges in compliance with the GT.
The GT applies to local exchanges of segment-copies among nodes, and such exchanges are very cheap. Also, each node can download segments from the expensive link (example LTE link in CN-D2D systems); the GT does not apply to such downloads. As noted above, each node downloads an initial subset of segments using the expensive link for kick-starting local exchanges.
In [37] , the authors studied the problem of centralized scheduling of GT-compliant internode exchanges for maximizing the aggregate cardinality. The motivation was to reduce aggregate cost of download over the expensive link and decisions regarding scheduling of link activations (i.e. exchange of full segment sets between two nodes constituting a link) were made by the facilitator only. The facilitator decides about the links to be activated on behalf of each node in the social group, in order to achieve a good system-wide state in this multi-agent system [24, 27, 28] . The authors in [35, [39] [40] [41] have emphasized the need for distributed decision making algorithms in multi-agent systems. Decentralized algorithms should be computationally tractable [39] for agents in the system.
In this work, we have assumed that all nodes truthfully reveal any private information asked by the mechanism. Truthfulness in nodes is not induced by the mechanism proposed in this paper. The algorithms 1 have low complexity and can be used for distributed decision making by nodes in a social group. If each node has access to the truthful information on segment availability with other nodes, then nodes perform very close to optimal. In Sect. 5, we simulated the scenario under the assumption of truthful information revelation by nodes in social group. If each node follows the linear complexity distributed links for sure algorithm (special case of Algorithm 2) then we observe that node obtains the best utility in most of the cases. 2 We will like to emphasize that link for sure algorithm is a linear complexity algorithm which makes the process computationally tractable [39] .
Authors in [37] have studied the problem of centralized scheduling in social groups complying with the GT for maximizing the aggregate cardinality. We study the decentralized version of the this problem in this paper. Unlike in [37] , nodes can accept or reject an invitation for link activation from other nodes. For activating a link, mutual consent from the participating nodes is necessary. In each decision slot, each node arranges the other nodes in decreasing order of preference. The preference list is derived on the basis of the utility that will be obtained by a node in case of link activation.
Nodes might choose to prune nodes, which will not return significant utility by pruning their preference lists. A node uses the Preferential Exploration Factor (PEF) to prune the preference list; after pruning, only a fraction of the original preference list is considered. In some instances, the requirement of mutual consent might leave some 3 segment aggressiveness probability (SAP) is the probability of downloading new segments using the expensive link. We propose practically implementable decentralized algorithms the nodes can use to maximize their individual utilities.
We define the Price of Choice to compare the equilibrium scenarios emerging due to decentralized link activation by nodes with the optimal aggregate utility, which can be obtained through centralized scheduling. Also, we propose an algorithm that can work in the absence of a facilitator; moreover it is asymptotically optimal. This paper makes the following contributions:
-We use the GT to prohibit non-reciprocating behavior in social groups. This, we believe, will help in understanding the fundamental principles of data sharing networks consisting of only selfish but contributing nodes. -We propose practically implementable decentralized algorithms for nodes, with preferential exploration (captured by the Preference Exploration Factor) and aggression for new nodes (captured by the Segment Aggressiveness Probability) namely, Limited Stable Pairing Algorithm for deciding upon its strategy in each slot. -For scenarios consisting of nodes which do not download new segments (after downloading the initial segment set), we use Price of Choice to benchmark performance of our proposed decentralized algorithms against the optimal. -We propose a Decentralized Randomized algorithm which can work in the absence of a facilitator and is asymptotically optimal.
This work has the following limitations:
-All the algorithms (except decentralized randomized algorithm) assume that truthful information has been given by the nodes. However, nodes can falsify information about the segment sets available with them. In such cases, performance of the nodes can degrade. -We do not consider scenarios where nodes falsify information about their segment sets.
We plan to address these concerns in our future work.
Our paper is arranged as follows: Sect. 2 describes the system model in detail. Section 3 presents a detailed analysis and proposes different algorithms depending on various scenarios. We define price of choice in Sect. 4. We evaluate and benchmark performances of various algorithms in Sect. 5. We provide our conclusions in Sect. 6, followed by some open problems in Sect. 7.
System model and problem formulation
We consider a set of nodes, M = {1, 2, . . . , m} and a universe N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of segments. Each node i ∈ M has an initial collection of segments O i ⊂ N .
Give-and-take (GT) criterion: Two nodes i, j ∈ M with segment sets X i and X j , respectively, can exchange copies of segments if and only if 4 X i ∩ X c j = ∅ and X c i ∩ X j = ∅, i.e. node j has at least one segment which is unavailable with node i and vice versa. After exchange, both nodes have the segment set X i ∪ X j .
We consider the set of nodes M as the vertices in an undirected graph G, where an edge or link exists between two vertices i, j ∈ M if and only if they satisfy the GT. We denote the link between nodes i and j by the unordered 2-tuple (i, j). Link (i, j) can be activated with the consents of node i and j only. After exchange, both nodes i and j will possess the union of their individual segment sets before exchange. We observe the system at discrete decision slots 5 r ∈ N. The graph at the beginning of the r th decision slot is denoted by G(r ) = (M , L (r )), where L (r ) denotes the set of links satisfying the GT. Also, l i (r ) denotes the set of nodes that satisfy the GT with node i in the r th slot.
Let O i (r ) be the segment set available with node i in the beginning of the r th slot. In the r th slot, node i will try to pair with one of the nodes with whom GT is satisfied based on its preferences. Strategy set for node i in the r th decision slot is given by,
where {0} denotes no pairing of node i. If strategy {0} is chosen by node i, then it will download one new segment uniformly at random from the content distributor with Segment Aggressiveness Probability (SAP) a i (r ) ∈ [0, 1], depending upon the node's aggressiveness for new segments. The segment to be downloaded will be selected uniformly at random from (O i (r )) c . Node i may limit the extent of exploring possibilities of link formation based on the Preference Exploration Factor (PEF), e i (r ) ∈ [0, 1].
The strategy chosen by node i in the r th decision slot is denoted by s i (r ) ∈ S i (r ). s −i (r ) denotes the set of strategies chosen by all nodes in M \ {i}. Link (i, j) can be activated in r th slot iff s i (r ) = j and s j (r ) = i. S(r ) = [s i (r )] m×1 is a column vector, where the ith element denotes the strategy chosen by node i in the r th slot. Also,Ŝ(r ) = [S(1), S(2) . . . S(r )] is a collection of all column vectors S(r ) till the end of the r th slot. C ex p (r ) = [c i (r )] m×1 is a column vector, where the ith element denotes the number of segments downloaded by node i from the content distributor till the end of the r th slot.
Node i's utility 6 u i (r ) at the beginning of r th decision slot, is a function of the segment
. . u m (r )] denotes the vector of utilities in the beginning of r th slot. We also define the aggregate utility function, u (r ) = i∈M u i (r ).
A series of link activations in decision slots will eventually lead to a slot r end , where the GT is not satisfied for any pair of nodes in M . Also,Ū (r ) =Ū (r end ) ∀ r ≥ r end . If there exists a pair of nodes in M satisfying the GT in any slot r , then these two nodes will give consent for the link activation as it would increase the utility for the pairing nodes. By definition of the GT, there will be no link between these pair of nodes following this slot. Hence, this slot needs to be defined as slot r end . Following r end slots, nodes will not be able to increase their utilities using inter-node exchanges.
Given an initial collection of truthful segment sets O i (1), where each node i chooses strategies on its own for the maximization of its utility, the following questions arise: -Since each node uses its preference list to decide whether to activate a link or not, is it possible that we have a deadlock situation, in which links are present in the graph, but no two nodes satisfying the GT agree for activation of link? -Assuming that deadlocks do not occur and we get to a point where there are no GTcompliant links in the graph, how does the aggregate utility achieved at the end compare with that achievable when all nodes abide by the decisions of a centralized facilitator?
Assumptions
A1: The cost of exchange among nodes is negligible compared to the cost of downloading a segment from outside the set M , as in [10] . The cost of downloading any one segment using the expensive link is c ex p . For simplicity of analysis, the cost of exchange among nodes is assumed to be zero.
A3: Each node has the same utility function, f (·), which is a strictly increasing function of the cardinality of the segment set available with it, i.e.
A4: In the beginning of each slot, each node has information about the various segment sets available with all other nodes (provided by the facilitator), though nodes choose their strategies in a decentralized manner. (We remove this assumption while analyzing Randomized Strategy Selection in Sect. 3.2). A5: We assume that all the participating nodes reveal information about their segment sets truthfully in each slot. Mathematically, each node i ∈ M reveals O i (r ) ∀r ∈ N truthfully to all the other nodes.
Maximizing the node's objective
In the problem, each node chooses a series of strategies for maximization of its own utility. However, the utility gain of choosing a strategy depends on the choice of strategies by other nodes as well.
Each node tries to maximize its utility by choosing strategies in each slot, so that the utility of the node towards the end can be maximized. While choosing a strategy in each slot, node i should consider the impact of the choice on future strategies of the other nodes, which in turn will be affecting the future strategies of node i. For the sake of analysis in this paper, we consider nodes to be myopic in deciding their strategies in each slot. i.e., nodes explore various opportunities for link formation and choose the one returning the best immediate utility gain. Immediate utility gain for node i in the r th slot can be defined as
Our problem of finding a pair of nodes in each slot, who agree to activate link among themselves can be modeled as the Stable Roommates Problem with Ties and Incomplete Lists (SRPTI) [42] . Each node i ∈ M has a preference list 7 of the nodes in l i (r ), such that node j 1 is strictly preferred over node j 2 in the r th slot, iff
A Stable Matching as defined in [42, 43] exists iff all nodes are able to find a pairing node. A Stable matching need not exist always. But there might exist matching in which only some nodes are able to find stable pairing node. Such matching consisting of at least 1 stable pair are termed as Partial Stable Matching (PSM).
Imposition of restrictions on utility functions (as per A3) in the context of our problem, ensures existence of PSM in each slot. We obtain PSM in each slot using the concepts in Phase 1 of the algorithms proposed in [42, 43] .
Hence, we find node's strategy by repeatedly modeling it as SRPTI. We obtain the utilities obtained in a decentralized manner under the various behavioral factors such as SAP and PEF. Analysis of the utilities towards the end, helps in characterizing download costs incurred 7 Node i may choose to ignore some nodes in l i (r ) based on value of its PEF in r th slot, e i (r ).
by the individual nodes in the social group over the expensive link for obtaining a desired common content.
Analysis

Deterministic strategy selection
We assume that nodes are myopic and choose strategies based on immediate utility increment in a slot. The strategy chosen by node i will yield positive utility iff the other node also chooses node i. A pair of nodes i and j forms a stable pair, iff k, such that (1)i prefers k over j, and (2) node k also prefers i over its current partner. A pair of nodes returning the best immediate utility in a slot is a stable pair; however, the reverse implication may not hold.
The best immediate utility to node i in r th slot is given by max
.
Proof If there exists at least one node that satisfies the GT with node i, then by definition of G f (r ), node i will have a unidirectional link from node i towards the node returning the maximum utility. Therefore, node i will have at least one outgoing link in G f (r ), if node i satisfies the GT with any node in M .
If node i has at least one outgoing link in G f (r ), then node i satisfies the GT with at least one node. Therefore, there ∃ j ∈ M such that (i, j) ∈ L (r ).
Proposition 1 For all r ≤ r end , there exists at least one cycle in G f (r ).
Proof Pick a node i 1 ∈ M having a link in G(r ). By Lemma 1, there exists a node i 2 
Now, let us assume that link
Using the same argument as above, starting from node i 2 , we can find a node i 3 such that
. Proceeding as above, due to finite number of nodes, we can obtain a maximal path
. By virtue of construction, node i q has an incoming link from node i q−1 . Therefore, link (i q−1 , i q ) ∈ L (r ). By an application of Lemma 1, we can argue that there exists a node i p , such that link i q → i p ∈ L f (r ). Now, if p / ∈ {1, 2, . . . q − 1}, then we can extend the path P q by concatenating the link i q → i p ∈ L f (r ); contradicting the assumption that path P q is maximal. Therefore, p ∈ {1, 2, . . . q − 1}, and the cycle i p → i p+1 → · · · → i q−1 → i q → i p exists.
Proposition 2 For all r ≤ r end , every cycle in G f (r ) consists of bidirectional links only.
Proof There are no self loops by definition of the GT. Hence, a cycle will have more than 1 node. Also, by definition of a bidirectional link, a cycle with 2 nodes is a bidirectional link.
Let us consider a cycle with q nodes (2 < q ≤ m) namely i 1 , i 2 , . . . i q , i 1 . If possible, let there be no bidirectional link in the cycle.
Since, node i 2 returns the best utility to node i 1 , therefore,
Also, existence of equality in (1) ⇒ i 1 → i q ∈ L f (r ), therefore, link between node i 1 and i q is bidirectional. So, taking strict inequality in (1):
Similarly, node i 3 returns the best utility to node i 2 , therefore,
Continuing in this manner we will get a set of inequalities like (2) and (3)
. . .
By adding all the inequalities, we get
Since the above inequality is inconsistent, there is a contradiction. Therefore, there exists at least one bidirectional link in the cycle. Hence, equality exists in one of the equations (4)- (8) .
Assuming equality in Eq. (8), and using it in Eq. (4)-(8). 8
Equation set (9)-(12) is inconsistent, hence equality exists in one of the equations (9)- (12) . Continuing in a similar manner, we get equalities in all equations, which proves that all links in the cycle are bidirectional. A PSM can also be defined as a collection of stable pairs such that no two stable pairs share a common node. A PSM such that unpaired nodes do not satisfy the GT is defined as a Maximal Partial Stable Matching (MPSM). Also, we define a Limited Preference Stable Matching (LPSM), 9 as a stable matching such that each of the paired nodes is paired with a node in its preference list, limited by the individual PEF's of the paired nodes.
Node i will limit its preference to the top most max ( e i (r ) |l i (r )| , 1) nodes in its preference list, where e i (r ) is the Preference Exploration Factor in the r th slot and |l i (r )| denotes the degree of node i in G(r ). If the value of PEF is very low, e i (r ) ≤ 1 m − 1 , then effectively, G(r ) will be G f (r ) as nodes will only consider the top preference in their preference list. For each unpaired node i in the r th slot, s i (r ) = {0} and node i will download a segment from (O i (r )) c uniformly at random with Segment Aggressiveness Probability, a i (r ).
Each node will follow the Limited Stable Pairing Algorithm (LSPA) as outlined in Algorithm 1. Algorithm 1 is based on algorithms proposed for various variants of Stable Roommates Problem in [42, 43] . If each of the nodes follows Algorithm 1, then a LPSM will be obtained in each slot. These algorithms are extended to incorporate PEF and SAP. For each decision slot in LSPA, each node tries to find a pairing node using the truncated preference list. If node i is unable to find a pairing node, then node i downloads a new segment with probability a i (r ). Pseudo code for LSPA is presented in Appendix 1.1. Algorithm 1 will be reduced to the Preferential Exploration Pairing Algorithm (PEPA) (Algorithm 2) if the nodes in the social group decide not to download new segments i.e. a i (r ) = 0 ∀ i ∈ M , r > 0. However, nodes in each slot limit their preferences to the top max (1, e i (r ) |l i (r )| ) nodes returning the maximum utility. We will obtain a LPSM matching in each slot of Algorithm 2. Pseudo code for PEPA is presented in Appendix 1.2.
If nodes are open to pairing with any of the nodes in all slots, i.e. e i (r ) = 1∀i ∈ M , r > 0, then Algorithm 2 can be further reduced to Link for Sure Algorithm (LSA). In this case, MPSM matching will be obtained in each slot.
Randomized strategy selection
For deterministic strategy selection, we assume that nodes know about segment sets available with each of the other nodes in each slot (Assumption A4), which requires overhead communication among nodes with the help of facilitator. However, there can be situations in which information about others' segment set is not available. For such scenarios, nodes would choose their partner nodes at random in each slot. We propose and analyze a randomized algorithm for partner selection.
In the beginning of each slot, each node i, chooses a node among M \ {i}. If the chosen node also chooses node i, then the link between them is activated, if the GT is satisfied. If the link cannot be activated, then node i remains unpaired in the current slot. This process is continued until no link exists in the graph (L (r ) = ∅).
Algorithm 3 is based on algorithm being used in Bittorrent based peer-to-peer networks [15, 44] and GT-compliant peer-to-peer networks [36] .
Algorithm 3 is applicable irrespective of the number of the initial segments available with nodes however, for the sake of analysis, we assume node i has chosen k ∈ {1, 2, 3 . . . n − 1} segments uniformly at random from the universe N .
Theorem 1 If initial segments sets (O i 's) are chosen uniformly at random from
then the social group following the randomized algorithm is asymptotically optimal 10 in m,
Proof In each decision epoch r , various link activations might take place. At decision epoch r , a link between node i and j will be activated iff, (a) node i chooses node j; (b) node j choose node i; and (c) the GT is satisfied between nodes i and j For notational convenience, let x (r,i) = |O i (r )| , where O i (r ) denotes the segment set available with node i at the beginning of decision slot r . Also, let s (r,i) denote the node chosen 11 in slot r by node i. At the start of the first decision slot, each node has x (1,i) = k segments that are picked uniformly at randomly from the universe N . Let node i choose node j r in the r th decision slot, i.e s (r,i) = j r , where j r is chosen uniformly at random from M \ {i}.
The segment set with node i at the beginning of slot r is O i (r ) = e 1 , e 2 · · · e |O i (r )| . For every decision slot r , and any segment e ∈ O j r (r ), we define random variables X e ( j r , r ):
For slot 1, node i's segment set cardinality increase after exchange, x (2,i) − x (1,i) , will equal the number of segments that are available with node j 1 but not with node i, iff s (r, j r ) = i, i.e.
x (2,i) 
Now,
where (a) follows from linearity of expectation. (b) follows from independence of events. In (c) we have made the following substitutions, (1,i)) (d) follows from summation over all possible nodes in M \ {i}.
Since, E(x (1,i) ) is a natural number, first equality in (16) follows from definition. Second equality follows from definition of function. n E(x (1,i) (1,i) 
E(x (2,i) 
Due to the symmetry of the system, and fact that initial segment sets and choice of nodes are uniformly distributed, we can argue that for each r ≥ 1, the segment set O i (r ) is distributed uniformly among all n |O i (r )| possibilities for the given |O i (r )|. Now, generalizing (17) for any r ≥ 2,
Now the sequence E(x (r,i) ) is monotonically increasing and bounded above by n. As m → ∞, let sequence E(x (r,i) ) converges to y > 0. Then, the steady state analysis of Equation 18 suggests the following must hold:
Taking limit m → ∞ on both sides, we get y = n. Hence, each node gets n segments asymptotically. Thus, asymptotically in m, i.e. for large number of nodes aggregate cardinality approaches optimal aggregate cardinality (by use of Corollary 2) i.e. nm − (m mod 2). Therefore, for large m,
Price of choice
Considering a social group with non-aggressive nodes (i.e. a i (r ) = 0∀i ∈ M , r > 0), each node has many choices and can be matched in numerous ways at each slot. The utility being earned by a node also depends on choices made by other nodes. Each choice of a node in a slot can lead to different matching, and can lead to different utilities for the node towards the end. Only few nodes will be able to get the desired utilities at the end of all exchanges. However, there exists a series of choices such that at the end, the aggregate utility of all nodes can be maximized towards the end of all exchanges. Owing to the selfish approach of maximizing individual utilities, each node makes choices which might be optimal for it, but not for the social group. Such situations are observed in various other scenarios as well, where owing to selfish behavior of agents/players, the system tends to deviate from the optimal behavior. The Price of Anarchy (PoA) [45] is one such game theoretic concept to measure degradation in the efficiency of a system due to selfish behavior of the involved agents. It is a general notion that has been extended to diverse systems and notions of efficiency [46] [47] [48] [49] . The Price of Anarchy is defined as the ratio between the optimal 'centralized' solution and the 'worst equilibrium'. Different notions of equilibrium lead to variations in notion of Price of Anarchy as Pure PoA [50, 51] , Strong PoA [52] , Bayes-Nash PoA [51] , Price of Stability [53] etc.
We define Price of Choice (PoC) 12 as the ratio of the optimal 'centralized' solution to the terminal aggregate utility obtained under distributed mode, in which each node chooses its actions based on its own criteria:
α * denotes the optimal 'centralized' solution. 13 Optimal 'centralized' solution refers to the maximal aggregate utility of nodes over all possible order of link activations among nodes. u(r end ) denotes the terminal aggregate utility of all nodes at the end of all exchanges if choices specified byŜ(r end ) are being made.
For simulation purposes, we have assumed u i (r ) = f (|O i (r )|) = |O i (r )|, i.e. f (·) is the identity function. Hence, u(r end ) denotes the aggregate cardinality of all nodes at the end of all exchanges. Correspondingly, α * denotes the optimal aggregate cardinality that can be obtained by the GT compliant exchanges in the social group. The problem of computing α * has been addressed in [37] . Authors in [37] compute α * using the brute force method and compare the performance of various proposed algorithms with the optimal value of objective function.
Performance evaluation
Limited stable pairing algorithm (LSPA) evaluation
We evaluate the performance of the Algorithm 1, namely, LSPA for different social group scenarios. Each scenario consists of Segment Aggressiveness Probability (SAP) chosen from a discrete set, Preferential Exploration Factor (PEF) chosen from a discrete set, and a 3tuple (number of nodes m, universe size n, initial segment size k). For simplicity, in each simulated scenario values of SAP and PEF are kept constant across all nodes and slots. For each scenario, we perform Monte Carlo simulations where the initial segments sets are chosen uniformly at random. 14 We consider the following metrics of interest: -Normalized Mean Aggregate Cardinality (NMAC): This is defined as the ratio of the Mean Aggregate cardinality to mn. NMAC characterizes the fraction of segments which have been obtained by all nodes either by using the inter-node links or downloading from the server for a given value of SAP and PEF. Mathematically, NMAC is the mean of For a given SAP, with increasing PEF, the fraction of the universe obtained by social group increases, but the number of segments downloaded from the server decreases. Also, mean number of segments obtained per unit cost increases for the social group. On the other hand, for a given PEF, with increasing SAP, the fraction of the universe obtained by nodes also increases, at the expense of increased number of segments downloaded from the server. (20, 50, 6) and (30, 60, 5) . a NMAC for (m, n, k) ≡ (20, 50, 6) . b NMAC for (m, n, k) ≡ (30, 60, 5)
Fig. 3
Variation of normalized mean downloading cost (NMDC) for different values of SAP for (m, n, k) ≡ (20, 50, 6) and (30, 60, 5) . a NMDC for (m, n, k) ≡ (20, 50, 6) . b NMDC for (m, n, k) ≡ (30, 60, 5)
Fig. 4
Variation of Mean number of Segments per Unit Cost (MSUC) with PEF for different values of SAP for (m, n, k) ≡ (20, 50, 6) and (30, 60, 5) . a MSUC for (m, n, k) ≡ (20, 50, 6) . b MSUC for (m, n, k) ≡ (30, 60, 5) Also, mean number of segments obtained per unit cost decreases with increasing SAP for a constant PEF.
Hence, a low value of SAP (i.e., lower aggression for new segments) and high PEF (i.e., exploring large number of possibilities for link formation) can yield a high fraction of the universe to the group. Ideally, all nodes in the social group should have S AP = 0 and P E F = 1. (LSA) and Randomized Algorithm. For a particular set of (number of nodes m, universe size n, initial segment size k) values, we generate 1000 segment sets uniformly at random. For each such "sample point" or "run", the optimal aggregate cardinality is computed using the algorithms/methods described in [37] and each of the algorithms simulated. For each sample run, PoC is computed for each algorithm. Mean PoC (for 1000 sample points) is shown, along with the 95 % confidence interval.
Price of choice
Our results show that the link for sure algorithm (LSA) performs the best -it is able to achieve the lowest Price of Choice (PoC), which is close to 1. The value of PoC increases as PEF decreases for PEPA. PoC for the randomized algorithm also closely follows the PoC for LSA. In spite of differences between the LSA and randomized algorithms, one can observe that values of PoC obtained for the simulations are within 10 % of the desired value of PoC, i.e. 1.
Some key observations:
-PoC for Algorithm 2 (with PEF=1), that is LSA, is very close to 1: This shows that LSA performs very close to optimal centralized solution. Hence, if nodes are open to pairing with any of the nodes in all slots, then the total downloading cost over the expensive link can be reduced. -PoC for Algorithm 2 decreases with increasing value of Preferential Exploration Factor (PEF): Downloading cost for nodes from the content distributor reduces with the increas-ing value of PEF. As node explores more possibilities for link formation in every slot, social group's dependence on centralized content distributor decreases. -PoC for Randomized algorithm decreases as the number of nodes increases: This observation is consistent with result obtained in Theorem 1. The randomized algorithm performs close to optimal as the number of nodes increases, which leads to decrease in the value of PoC as verified using simulations.
Our results indicate that following the decentralized Link for Sure algorithm results in nearly optimal performance. Also, the linear complexity of (O(m)) of this algorithm 15 makes it quite attractive for practical applications as well. However, the social group needs to bear the cost of the overhead for sending information about segment sets to all nodes (Assumption A4).
In case, the social group does not want to bear the cost of the overhead for sending information, nodes can use the Randomized algorithm at the expense of slight inefficiency, as compared to the link for sure algorithm.
Conclusions
To summarize this paper low aggressiveness for new segments and exploration of maximum possibilities for link formation is in the interest of the node as well as the social group.
This paper is motivated in context of a common network architecture namely, social groups (being observed in various socio-technological networks namely, cellular network assisted Device-to-Device, cloud assisted Peer-to-Peer networks, hybrid Peer-to-Peer content distribution network and direct connect networks), where each member is interested in maximizing its own utility (which is an increasing function of cardinality of segment sets possessed by the node). These decentralized mutual exchanges will not only get nodes segments at low cost, but also decrease the cost of operation for the central server. However, to tackle the problem of non-reciprocating behavior arising in such situations, we use the GT criterion [37] , and explore a number of algorithms for exchange of segments, with each exchange to be GT-compliant. However, we are unable to induce truthfulness among nodes.
Based on their aggressiveness for new segments and preferential exploration, nodes can choose its strategies using the Limited Stable Pairing Algorithm. If a node is not aggressive about new segments, and also conservative about its preferences for exchanges, then Preferential Exploration Pairing Algorithm can be used for choosing strategies in each slot. The Link for Sure Algorithm can be used by nodes, which seek to explore all options for local exchange. We observe that following the linear complexity LSA the, PoC is within 3 % of the desired PoC of 1 at no additional cost to nodes. Thus, it turns that a "greedy" and simple policy like LSA performs very well, achieving a PoC very close to optimal. All deterministic strategic selection algorithms require information about the availability of segment sets in each slot, which might be unavailable. In that case nodes can use randomized algorithm. Using randomized algorithm, social group can reduce the cost of overhead communication among nodes and between nodes and facilitator as well at the expense of increased usage of the content distributor.
Limitations of model
As stated in Assumption A5, we have assumed that each node provides information about their segment sets in a truthful manner. Under this assumption, we observe that LSA achieves PoC very close to 1. Since PoC is close to 1, therefore most of the nodes fare their best in most of the cases. Based on our simulations, we observe that LSA performs very close to optimal. However, PoC for LSA may rise, when nodes falsify information. Hence, LSA is not incentive compatible [24] . In our future work, we are working towards algorithms which are incentive compatible [24, 39] .
Throughout this paper, we have used utility functions which are strictly increasing w.r.t. cardinality of the segment sets available with the node (Assumption A3). Such an assumption inherently assumes that all the segments have equal importance. And fetching any segment will increase the node's utility by same amount. This might not be true in general. Nodes might prefer certain segments over other segments. The problem of differential preference of segments is not attempted in this paper.
Future work
Some of the algorithms in this paper require information about the availability of segment sets in each slot to be shared with other nodes. This can be practically implemented with the help of a facilitator (which plays a role similar to the tracker in a P2P network). Also, it was assumed that the nodes provide the information on segment availability truthfully. Inducing trustfulness among nodes is a necessary condition for the process to be incentive compatible [24] . We observe that the proposed process is immune to various common freeriding strategies (namely multiple identities [13] , Sybil attack [21, 22] and collusion [23] ) that might be used by nodes, but not Strategy proof [24] . Nodes can falsify information for obtaining undue benefits. Defending against this is a part of a ongoing work. Nodes can falsify information based on either a secret strategy or in a probabilistic manner. Owing to the combinatorial nature of the problem, it will be difficult to analyze the first case. However, if a node's history is considered, one can easily find out the nodes that are overstating their segment sets for increasing their preference for link formation. We will be analyzing the impact of probabilistic information falsification (without considering node's history) in the future.
Also, in this work, we have assumed that all nodes have homogeneous utility functiona strictly increasing function of the cardinality of the segment sets available with nodes. However, node(s) may have utility functions which do not fall within this scope. Hence, we would like to study the node's evolution when the social group consists of nodes with heterogeneous and generic utility functions. With heterogeneous utility functions, nodes might choose to follow different algorithms. We would like to analyze scenarios where nodes have heterogeneous and generic utility functions with nodes following different decentralized algorithms for utility maximization.
Throughout this paper, we have assumed the GT to be applicable for all exchanges among nodes in the social group. The special case of 'Full Exchange' might not be true in general. Nodes might not be willing to give away a large number of segments if they are getting only a few segments in return. Also, nodes might choose to follow different exchange criteria.
Proof Trivial upper bound on aggregate cardinality is given by nm as system consists of m nodes and n segments. For odd number of nodes, it follows from the fact that number of nodes with universe can be even only. Hence, considering the best possible scenario where m − 1 nodes have got the universe. And node without universe will have at least 1 segment missing, therefore, optimal aggregate cardinality is upper bounded by nm − (m mod 2).
